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essential for outbreak preparedness by first
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Abstract
Background: Preparedness is considered essential for healthcare organizations to respond effectively to outbreaks.
In the current study we aim to capture the views of first responders on what they consider key recommendations
for high quality preparedness. Furthermore, we identified the recommendations with the highest urgency from the
perspective of first responders.
Methods: We chose a multistep approach using a systematic Delphi procedure. Previously extracted recommendations
from scientific literature were presented to a national and two international expert panels. We asked the experts to score
the recommendations based on relevance for high quality preparedness. In addition we asked them to choose the ten
most urgent recommendations.
Results: Starting with 80 recommendations from scientific literature, 49 key recommendations were selected by both
international expert panels. Differences between both panels were mainly on triage protocols. In addition, large
differences were found in the selection of the ten most urgent recommendations.
Conclusions: In this study infectious disease experts selected a set of key recommendations representing high quality
preparedness and specified which ones should be given the highest urgency when preparing for a future crisis. These
key recommendations can be used to shape their preparedness activities.
Background
Since 1940, the frequency of outbreaks and the diversity
of infectious disease pathogens have increased signifi-
cantly [1, 2]. Most outbreaks are successfully dealt with
at the local or regional level, but some have the propen-
sity to become epidemics. Outbreaks trigger anxiety in
the general population and require prompt and adequate
actions from healthcare organizations and healthcare
professionals [3]. Healthcare organizations have to deal
with an increased number of (potentially) infected
patients and have to accommodate new procedures and
algorithms that interfere with daily routines. Moreover,
professionals with various backgrounds of expertise need
to work together in a coordinated way to respond to the
outbreak [4]. Unfortunately, recent outbreak evaluations
show that outbreak response is often suboptimal; there
is considerable room for improvement [5, 6].
For healthcare organizations preparedness is consid-
ered essential to respond quickly and effectively to out-
breaks in order to minimize the spread of pathogens and
to reduce the number of infected persons. Preparedness
requires an operational mindset focused on the develop-
ment of formal procedures and guidelines in all pre-
paredness phases, even during the period when there is
no threat or outbreak. Many studies conclude that while
at the national level preparedness guidelines and
procedures are often in place, regional healthcare
organizations are not always fully prepared [7–9]. It is a
challenge for first responders to optimally prepare for
outbreaks. The process of outbreak preparedness is time
consuming and costly for healthcare organizations and
asks for a shared responsibility of various actors in the
field [10]. Therefore it is important that preparedness
activities are efficient and effective, i.e. actually contribute
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to a better response. There are, however, no widely ac-
cepted standards for optimal outbreak preparedness for
first responders as -due to the infrequency and the acute
nature of outbreaks- there is little systematic evidence
linking preparedness activities to response outcomes [10,
11].
This lack of clear and agreed upon standards does
not guide first responders in optimal preparedness.
The CDC [12], ECDC [13] and RAND corporation
[14] developed tools to support preparedness planners
and assess the level of preparedness. These tools,
however, are intended primarily for public health orga-
nizations and are not specifically aimed at first re-
sponders, or focus solely on quality improvement
without quality measurement, or focus on an influenza
pandemic only.
Previously, we systematically reviewed the scientific
preparedness literature and generated a series of 80 gen-
eric recommendations representing optimal outbreak
preparedness for first responders originating from indus-
trialized countries (low and middle income country set-
tings were excluded) (Huis, A., Belfroid E., Klein
Breteler, J., van Steenbergen, J., Hulscher, M. Defining
and improving healthcare system's preparedness for in-
fectious disease outbreaks: a systematic review identify-
ing generic key recommendations and their connections
to continuous quality improvement. Submitted). First re-
sponders were defined as organizations which are dir-
ectly involved in providing healthcare during an
infectious disease outbreak (including primary-, second-
ary-, tertiary- and home and community care providers),
or indirectly involved in providing healthcare services
during an outbreak (including local health departments,
and clinical diagnostic laboratories). In the current study
we aim to capture the views of first responders on the
relevance of each recommendation as a criterion for
high quality preparedness. Furthermore, we aim to iden-
tify those recommendations that have the highest ur-
gency to be implemented from the perspective of the
first responders. We compare two expert groups, the
ECDC National Focal Points for preparedness and re-
sponse, and authors of important papers on outbreak
preparedness.
Methods
We chose a multistep approach using a Delphi proced-
ure [15] to select a set of key recommendations repre-
senting high quality infectious disease preparedness
from a first responder’s perspective. Recommendations
extracted from scientific literature (Huis, A., Belfroid E.,
Klein Breteler, J., van Steenbergen, J., Hulscher, M. De-
fining and improving healthcare system's preparedness
for infectious disease outbreaks: a systematic review
identifying generic key recommendations and their
connections to continuous quality improvement. Sub-
mitted) were prepared for the questionnaire round (step
1), see Fig. 1. The recommendations were presented to a
national panel (step 2) in order to pilot the question-
naire, clarify the wording, and condense the number of
recommendations resulting in an amended question-
naire. The amended questionnaire was presented to two
international expert panels (step 3), the ECDC National
Focal Points for preparedness and response, and authors
of important papers on outbreak preparedness. The re-
sults from these two international expert panels were
compared to gain insight into their perspectives. Formal
ethical approval from a medical ethical committee was
not required for this research in the Netherlands since it
does not entail subjecting participants to medical treat-
ment or imposing specific rules of conduct on partici-
pants. All the experts consented to participate in the
study and were aware that their responses would be used
for research purposes.
Step 1: From systematic review to questionnaire
The systematic review yielded 80 recommendations
(Huis, A., Belfroid E., Klein Breteler, J., van Steenbergen,
J., Hulscher, M. Defining and improving healthcare sys-
tem's preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks: a
systematic review identifying generic key recommenda-
tions and their connections to continuous quality im-
provement. Submitted). The ones with a more general
formulation which included more than one concept
were split into concept specific recommendations. The
recommendations were processed in an online question-
naire (using Limesurvey, an open source web application
to develop, publish and collect responses to online sur-
veys) to be administered to the panels in the next steps.
Step 2: National expert panel
Expert panel
For the national panel a multidisciplinary group of
experts on outbreak preparedness were invited. The
main selection criteria for inclusion in the panel were
the variety of specialties actually involved in outbreak
preparedness and diversity of practice settings. The
panel was invited per e-mail or telephone in Novem-
ber 2014.
Assessment of key recommendations
We asked the experts to appraise the relevance of the rec-
ommendations using a nine point Likert scale (1 = highly
irrelevant, 9 = highly relevant). Each group of recommen-
dations also contained an open textbox that the experts
could use for remarks or to add a recommendation.
Data were analyzed using SPSS, median relevance
scores were calculated for each recommendation. Rec-
ommendations with a median score > 7 and agreement
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(>70% of the scores in the highest tertile) were directly
selected. Recommendations with a median score >7 and
no agreement (<70% of the scores in the highest tertile)
were submitted for discussion. The remarks of the ex-
perts on recommendations with a median score of seven
were assessed by the researchers (EB, AH, JvS, AT, MH).
If the remarks suggested a textual amendment of the
recommendation the recommendation was also marked
“discussion”. Recommendation with a median score < 7
were rejected.
Fig. 1 Selection procedure key recommendations. Legenda: S = Selected, D = Discussion, R = Rejected, N = New added. *This recommendation
was rejected by the national experts but added to step 3 because in the Dutch legislation compulsory vaccination is forbidden
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Face-to-face meeting
In this meeting, recommendations previously marked
for discussion could be accepted without change, altered
textually or rejected by group discussion. The face-to-
face meeting was held on December 15th 2014. The
online questionnaire was revised on the basis of the
results from step 2 and served as input for step 3.
Step 3: Two international expert panels
To reach first responders in a high number of countries
with substantial interregional differences we decided to
approach the National Focal Points for Preparedness
and Response and urged them to fill out the question-
naire from a first responder’s perspective in their
country.
Expert panels
The first panel consisted of the ECDC National Focal
Points for preparedness and response or their alternates
designated by the EU member states to represent them in
ECDC meetings. We aimed for one response per country
from the National Focal Point or the alternate National
Focal Point. The panel was invited per e-mail to partici-
pate. The panel was conducted between April 2015 and
July 2015. The second panel consisted of international ex-
perts on outbreak preparedness who were approached per
email or letter. We invited the first, second and last au-
thors of the papers included in the previously conducted
systematic review because of their scientific reputation in
the field illustrated by peer-reviewed publications on the
subject of front line preparedness(Huis, A., Belfroid E.,
Klein Breteler, J., van Steenbergen, J.,Hulscher, M., Defin-
ing and improving healthcare system's preparedness for
infectious disease outbreaks: a systematic review identify-
ing generic key recommendations and their connections
to continuous quality improvement. Submitted). The
panel was invited between July 2015 and February 2016.
Non-responders from both groups received at least one
reminder per letter or e-mail. We aimed for 7–15 partici-
pants per expert group as this is the recommended num-
ber of participants [15].
In step 3, we submitted the revised questionnaire for
assessment to both international panels.
Assessment of key recommendations
The assessment procedure of recommendations was the
same as previously explained in step 2. In addition, we
asked the experts to “select the ten recommendations
out of the total number of 61 you consider the ones with
the highest urgency to implement”. Recommendations
were considered urgent if more than 30% of the experts
chose them as such.
Results
Step 1
The 80 recommendations presented in the systematic re-
view were systematically translated into 91 recommenda-
tions for the questionnaire. For example: ‘Healthcare
institutions should provide ongoing education programs
about infection prevention for employees, and they should
organize regular disaster drills and exercises’ was translated
into two recommendations: ‘Healthcare organizations
should provide ongoing infection prevention education
programs for employees’ and ‘Healthcare organizations
should organize regular infectious disease drills/exercises’.
Six domains emerged from the raw data and the recom-
mendations were categorized accordingly:
a) ‘construction and maintenance of the outbreak
preparedness plan’ which describes the development
and updating of the preparedness plan in
collaboration with relevant partners,
b) ‘support for health professionals, patients and
families’ which describes education and training,
infection control measures and psychosocial
assistance for healthcare professionals,
c) ‘surge capacity’ which describes triage, infrastructure
and equipment,
d) ‘communication to the public, patients and families’
which describes communication strategies,
e) ‘coordination and collaboration’ which describes
coordination and collaboration with the relevant
stakeholders, and
f ) ‘facilitators for implementation of plans’ which
describes facilitating recommendations for the
implementation of plans and protocols.
Step 2
Expert panel
Nineteen Dutch experts were invited to fill out the digital
questionnaire. Fourteen experts filled out the question-
naire (response rate 74%). The expert group consisted of
the following experts; infectious disease specialist, infec-
tion control preventionist, General Practitioner, medical
microbiologist, public health specialist, public health
nurse, disaster management expert, and a virologist). Rea-
sons for non-response were: a lack of expertise on the
subject (n = 2), personal circumstances (n = 2) and un-
known (n = 1).
Assessment of key recommendations
Forty-eight recommendations were directly selected.
Fourteen recommendations were marked ‘for discussion’
(12 recommendations had a median of eight but less
than 70% of the scores in the highest tertile and two had
a median of seven and the experts’ comments suggested
a textual amendment of the recommendation). Twenty-
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nine recommendations were rejected. The rejected
recommendations described, to name some examples,
addressing psychosocial needs of healthcare workers,
vaccination of healthcare personnel and prioritization of
support services.
Face-to-face meeting
All experts that filled out the digital questionnaire (n = 14)
were invited for the meeting. Six of the 14 experts (43%)
attended the meeting. The 14 recommendations with the
label “discussion” and the two ones with textual amend-
ments were reviewed. This resulted in two recom-
mendations being accepted, nine recommendations being
textually amended, one newly added recommendation,
and three recommendations being rejected.
The 60 accepted recommendations in step 2 were in-
cluded in step 3. One recommendation that was rejected
in step 2 was included in the questionnaire for step 3 be-
cause in the Dutch legislation compulsory vaccination is
forbidden (see Table 2, recommendation number 12). In
total 61 recommendations were included in the ques-
tionnaire, see Table 2.
Step 3
Expert panels
National Focal Points Thirty countries were invited to
fill out the digital questionnaire. We sent the invitation
e-mail to 30 ECDC National Focal Points for Prepared-
ness and Response and 27 alternates (three countries did
not have an alternate). Fifteen experts filled out the ques-
tionnaire from 14 different countries (country response
rate 47%): Italy, Germany, Norway, Lithuania, Denmark,
Slovenia, Malta, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Cyprus, Romania, Hungary and Croatia (Table 1). One of
these responses was incomplete. Reasons for non-
response were unknown (n = 16 countries). From one
country we received two responses, one from the National
Focal Point and one from the alternate National Focal
Point. Because this was the only country with more than
one response, we decided to exclude the latest arriving re-
sponse. Including both responses in the analysis would
give this country more weight than others in the results
(each response is valued equal). We performed the ana-
lysis on 14 responses (of which one was incomplete, the
respondent assessed the first ten recommendations) from
14 countries.
Preparedness experts While applying the selection cri-
teria 60 experts were identified and invited to fill out the
questionnaire. Three of the selected experts could not
be invited due to unavailable contact information. Eight
experts filled out the questionnaire (response rate 14%),
see Table 1. One of the responses was incomplete.
Reasons for non-response were: contact information in-
correct (n = 6), no expert on the subject (n = 1) and un-
known (n = 42). Our experts ranged from clinical to
emergency management and public health. Five of the
preparedness experts worked at a university. The expert
group consisted of two professors of public health, a dir-
ector of general intensive care unit, an epidemiologist, a
professor of pediatrics (head of infectious diseases unit), an
infectious diseases consultant, a professor of environmental
and occupational health (Institute for Biosecurity), a senior
consultant on emergency management who is also a fac-
ulty member in the emergency medicine department at a
university. The preparedness experts had between 10 and
26 years of experience in their current function.
Assessment of key recommendations
Fifty-six recommendations were selected by the National
Focal Points, see Table 2. Four recommendations were
marked ‘for discussion’. One recommendation was
rejected and one recommendation was newly added.
Fifty-two recommendations were selected by the pre-
paredness experts, see Table 2. Five recommendations
were marked for ‘discussion’. Four recommendations
were rejected and no new recommendations were added.
There was a large amount of overlap between both
groups. Fourty-nine recommendations were accepted by
both the National Focal Points and the preparedness ex-
perts and two recommendations were marked ‘for dis-
cussion’ by both groups. Ten recommendations were
appraised differently by the two panels. Five recommen-
dations were selected by one group but rejected by the
other group and five recommendations were accepted by
Table 1 Respondent characteristics
National Focal Points Preparedness experts
Response N total = 14
N complete = 13
N incomplete = 1
N total = 8
N complete = 7
N incomplete = 1
Countries Belgium
Croatia
Cyprus
Denmark
Germany
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Romania
Slovenia
Australia (2)
Israel (2)
Italy (2)
USA (2)
Years of
experience
Mean: 7.93
SD: 6.28
Mean: 15.38
SD: 5.66
Type of
organization
(National) Institute for
Public Health (10)
Ministry of health (4)
University (4)
National Institute for Infectious
Diseases/Public Health (2)
Ministry of Health + University
Academic hospital
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Table 2 Key recommendations
Domain No Key recommendation National Focal
Points
Prep.
experts
Construction and maintenance of
the outbreak preparedness plan
1 Staff responsible for outbreak preparedness planning from small
healthcare organizations should have access to education and training
in outbreak planning.
S S
2 The organization's infectious disease preparedness plan should be
updated.
S S
3 Healthcare organizations should develop their organizational
infectious disease preparedness plan in a multidisciplinary internal
committee.
S
MU
S
4 Healthcare organizations should tune their organizational infectious
disease preparedness plan with all (local/regional/national)
organizations that they interact with during outbreaks.
S
MU
S
MU
5 The organization's infectious disease preparedness plan should be
generic (flexible and adaptable to the actual situation).
S
MU
S
MU
6 The organization's infectious disease preparedness outbreak plan
should correspond with the national guidelines, but should deviate to
fit the local situation.
S
MU
S
7 Resources for developing, testing, and updating a preparedness plan
should be made available.
S
MU
S
8 Healthcare organizations should have a dedicated staff position
responsible for infectious disease preparedness.
D D
9 The organization’s outbreak preparedness plan and its updates should
be disseminated and implemented in multiple and various ways by
the responsible management.
S
MU
S
10 Healthcare workers should be able to access the organizations
preparedness plan (for example on the intranet).
S S
Support for health professionals,
patients and families
11 An infectious disease preparedness plan should include items for staff
protection; nb in case of uncertainty protection should start at the
highest required level in the actual setting whereby the protection of
employees is guaranteed, adapted for the specific situation.
S
MU
S
MU
12 A procedure should be developed to mandate the designated
employees to receive the (for the outbreak designated) vaccine and/or
antiviral prophylaxisa.
S S
13 Drills and exercises to assess how various healthcare facility's plans
interact should be multidisciplinary.
S S
14 Healthcare organizations should evaluate their level of preparedness. S S
MU
15 Healthcare organizations should provide ongoing infection prevention
education programs for employees.
S S
16 Healthcare organizations should organize regular infectious disease
drills/exercises
S
MU
S
17 Healthcare workers should be educated and trained in outbreak
handling.
S S
18 Training materials for infection control measures should be available at
the healthcare organization.
S S
19 Instructors providing training should be trained instructors. S D
20 The senior management should identify staff that has to participate in
training programs.
S S
21 The senior management should allocate staff to the defined roles. S D
22 The senior management should verify that the identified staff
participated in the training.
S S
23 All designated professionals should be trained. S
MU
S
MU
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Table 2 Key recommendations (Continued)
24 Healthcare organizations should anticipate addressing mistrust, fear,
moral maintenance, and sustainability of health care workers.
S S
25 All relevant employees should be fit-tested for PPE use. S D
26 The organization should appoint a person who is available for
questions from the staff on PPE use.
S S
27 Compliance of healthcare workers with transmission-based precautions
should be enforced by diverse strategies.
S R
28 An infectious disease preparedness plan should include items
supporting infection control (including measures to prevent
contamination) for all phases of the outbreak.
S
MU
S
MU
29 Healthcare organizations should take into account that they might
need to put potentially infectious (asymptomatic) healthcare workers
on administrative leave.
S S
30 Healthcare organizations should plan to monitor the health of
exposed healthcare workers for the maximum incubation period.
S S
31 Healthcare organizations should plan to screen patients with
infectious disease symptoms.
S S
32 Specific protocols for high risk procedures should be available for high
risk infectious diseases.
S S
Surge capacity 33 Health care organizations providing patient care should have an
overview of the general features of the organization (e.g. logistic
structures including private rooms, toilets, wards, rooms dedicated to
infectious disease, rooms equipped with negative pressure systems,
safe waste disposal).
S S
34 Health care organizations should plan to expand their capacity. S S
MU
35 Hospitals should have at least one isolation room which is technically
well-equipped and logistically adequate.
S S
36 Healthcare organizations should have access to adequate laboratory
facilities for screening and follow-up.
S S
37 Healthcare organizations should have access to a single, simple
reporting framework to minimize the administrative burden to
reporting.
D D
38 Healthcare organizations should have a plan to access, coordinate,
and increase labor resources for continued and expanded care.
S S
39 Healthcare organizations should have an up to date inventory of the
total number of personnel (medical and non-medical staff) with pa-
tient contact and without patient contact.
S S
40 Healthcare organizations should have an access plan in place for
stockpiling and distribution.
D S
MU
41 Senior management should prepare to provide adequate resources to
respond to an outbreak.
S
MU
S
42 Healthcare organizations should prepare for immediate installation of
a surveillance network to monitor the burden of disease during an
outbreak in relation to the capacity of healthcare.
S S
43 Healthcare organizations should prepare for monitoring of exposed
cases.
S S
44 Healthcare organizations should plan to inform ambulance and
organization’s (hospital) staff when a case was transferred.
S S
45 Healthcare organizations should have triage protocols for infectious
disease outbreaks.
S S
46 Triage protocols should be developed supra institutional. S R
47 Triage protocols should include an ethical framework to manage
competing priorities to relevant pathways of decision making.
S R
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one group but ‘for discussion’ by the other group. Most
of the differences were in the domain ‘surge capacity’
and described the triage protocols.
Ten most urgent recommendations selected by National
Focal Points and preparedness experts
Table 3 displays the selected recommendations by both
groups. Five recommendations were selected by both
groups. Four of these recommendations concerned the
development of the preparedness plan and one recom-
mendation the training of healthcare professionals. In
addition, the National Focal Points selected nine and the
preparedness experts four different recommendations as
‘most urgent’. Out of the nine additionally selected
recommendations by the National Focal Points four
described the preparedness plan, one preparedness
exercises, two described sharing information with other
organizations, one described the provision of resources
and one the installation of an outbreak control group.
Out of the four additionally selected recommendations
by the preparedness experts one described an access
plan for stockpiling and distribution, one the evaluation
of the level of preparedness, one the plan to expand the
healthcare organization’s capacity and one the collabor-
ation with regional key stakeholders.
Discussion
In this study infectious disease experts selected a set of
key recommendations representing high quality pre-
paredness and specified which ones should be given the
highest urgency when preparing for a future crisis.
Several attempts have been made to develop recom-
mendations for outbreak preparedness [11–14]. These
recommendations differ in perspective, number of
Table 2 Key recommendations (Continued)
48 Healthcare organizations should have a triage system for infectious
disease outbreaks.
S S
49 A preparedness plan should include objective criteria to activate and
stop triage protocols.
D S
50 Triage protocols should be tuned regionally. S R
51 The public health preparedness plan should define identify and
designate staff for supporting and maintaining (suspected/probable/
possible/confirmed) cases in home isolation.
S S
Communication to the public,
patients and families
52 Healthcare organizations should have communication strategies for
patients and their families.
S S
Coordination and collaboration 53 Organizations should have a multidisciplinary organizational
preparedness committee to ensure the organization is well prepared.
S S
54 Ensure that an outbreak coordinator can be appointed in an outbreak
situation.
S S
55 Healthcare organizations should prepare for installing an outbreak
control group (e.g. an outbreak management team) in case of a threat
to coordinate the response.
S
MU
S
56 A communication and coordination system between each healthcare
organization and the local/regional/state/country public health
authorities should be established.
S
MU
S
57 Healthcare organizations should collaborate, coordinate, and
communicate with key regional stakeholders for outbreak
preparedness.
S S
MU
58 Healthcare organizations should plan to establish a regional outbreak
control group to exercise authority and direction over resources in the
region.
R S
59 Healthcare organizations should develop an internal information
channel to ensure up-to-date information is factual, accurate, and reli-
able while preventing information overload.
S
MU
S
Facilitators for implementation
of plans
60 Healthcare organizations should have strategies to ensure effective
and responsive leadership.
S S
61 Senior-level management should be prepared to provide good
leadership.
S S
New recommendations added Healthcare organizations should do a risk assessment and develop
scenarios for the most probable outbreak situations.
Added by the National
Focal Points
Legenda: S selected, D discussion, R rejected, MU selected for most urgent
aThis recommendation was rejected by the national experts in step 2 but the authors added the recommendation to step 3 because in the Dutch legislation
compulsory vaccination is forbidden
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healthcare organizations the recommendations apply to,
type of healthcare organization and, level of detail and
specificity. Our key recommendations, in contrast to the
existing recommendations, are specifically developed
from the perspective of first responders to guide them in
selecting relevant preparedness activities for their
organization, and not from a regional or national per-
spective. When aggregating this information at regional
level, policy makers can map the strengths and weak-
nesses of the region as a whole and decide upon specific
interventions to improve overall preparedness.
Several patterns emerge when analyzing the final set.
Firstly, the selected recommendations do not focus on
psychosocial aspects of outbreak preparedness, such as
‘childcare for employees’ and ‘mental support for em-
ployees’. Recommendations regarding psychosocial aspects
have been rejected in step 2. The international expert
panels in step 3 had the option to add new recommenda-
tions but no recommendation regarding psychosocial
aspects was added to the list. During large outbreaks, these
aspects are highly important to ensure employees work
attendance and commitment to sustained efforts, while
possibly finding themselves at risk of acquiring and trans-
mitting the disease to their family and friends [16]. We
assume these recommendations were rejected because the
expert panel mainly consisted of doctors and policy
makers who tend to focus on the organizational and med-
ical aspects of preparedness, rather than the conditions
Table 3 Selected most urgent recommendations
Selected 10 most urgent recommendations National Focal
Points (N = 13)
Selected 10 most urgent recommendations preparedness
experts (N = 7)
Agreements The organization's infectious disease preparedness plan
should be generic (flexible and adaptable to the actual
situation) (N = 10, 77%)
Healthcare organizations should tune their organizational
infectious disease preparedness plan with all (local/
regional/national) organizations that they interact with
during outbreaks (N = 5, 38%)
An infectious disease preparedness plan should include
items for staff protection; nb in case of uncertainty
protection should start at the highest required level in the
actual setting whereby the protection of employees is
guaranteed, adapted for the specific situation (N = 5, 38%)
An infectious disease preparedness plan should include
items supporting infection control (including measures to
prevent contamination) for all phases of the outbreak
(N = 4, 31%)
All designated professionals should be trained (N = 4, 31%)
The organization's infectious disease preparedness plan
should be generic (flexible and adaptable to the actual
situation) (N = 3, 43%)
Healthcare organizations should tune their organizational
infectious disease preparedness plan with all (local/
regional/national) organizations that they interact with
during outbreaks (N = 4, 57%)
An infectious disease preparedness plan should include
items for staff protection; nb in case of uncertainty
protection should start at the highest required level in the
actual setting whereby the protection of employees is
guaranteed, adapted for the specific situation (N = 3, 43%)
An infectious disease preparedness plan should include
items supporting infection control (including measures to
prevent contamination) for all phases of the outbreak
(N = 5, 71%)
All designated professionals should be trained (N = 3, 43%)
Differences Healthcare organizations should develop their
organizational infectious disease preparedness plan in a
multidisciplinary internal committee (N = 7, 54%)
A communication and coordination system between each
healthcare organization and the local/regional/state/
country public health authorities should be established
(N = 6, 46%)
Resources for developing, testing, and updating a
preparedness plan should be made available (N = 5, 38%)
Healthcare organizations should organize regular infectious
disease drills/exercises (N = 5, 38%)
Healthcare organizations should develop an internal
information channel to ensure up-to-date information is
factual, accurate, and reliable while preventing information
overload (N = 5, 38%)
The organization's infectious disease preparedness
outbreak plan should correspond with the national
guidelines, but should deviate to fit the local situation
(N = 4, 31%)
The organization’s outbreak preparedness plan and its
updates should be disseminated and implemented in
multiple and various ways by the responsible management
(N = 4, 31%)
Senior management should prepare to provide adequate
resources to respond to an outbreak (N = 4, 31%)
Healthcare organizations should prepare for installing an
outbreak control group (e.g. an outbreak management
team) in case of a threat to coordinate the response
(N = 4, 31%)
Healthcare organizations should have an access plan in
place for stockpiling and distribution (N = 4, 57%)
Healthcare organizations should evaluate their level of
preparedness (N = 3, 43%)
Health care organizations should plan to expand their
capacity (N = 3, 43%)
Healthcare organizations should collaborate, coordinate,
and communicate with key regional stakeholders for
outbreak preparedness (N = 3, 43%)
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that facilitate health care professionals to attend work.
Literature shows that psychosocial needs need to be taken
into account [17–20]. More research is needed to deter-
mine the specific needs of healthcare workers during out-
breaks and the corresponding preparedness activities.
Secondly, we found a high level of consistency (49 recom-
mendations) in the selection of relevant commendations
from the initial set, by both panels. This shows that almost
all preselected recommendations were considered import-
ant by our experts teams. Thirdly, both panels endorsed
the importance of the preparedness for triage, a key com-
ponent of outbreak response. Both groups agreed that
healthcare organizations need to have triage protocols.
The way to prepare for triage was, however, rather differ-
ent for both panels. While the National Focal Points
considered the supra institutional development of triage
protocols, the inclusion of an ethical framework in the
protocol and regional tuning of the protocols relevant key
recommendations, the preparedness experts rejected
them. Contrarily, the key recommendation on objective
criteria to activate and stop triage protocols was rejected
by the National Focal Points but accepted by the prepared-
ness experts. This reflects a longstanding debate on triage
protocols. It is practically impossible to predict what situa-
tions might develop in an outbreak so it can be rather
challenging to develop universal triage protocols
beforehand. On the other hand, triage is a very political
sensitive topic. It can thus be useful to consider a variety
of aspects in detail beforehand and incorporate them in a
triage protocol. There is no literature available that pro-
vides a sufficient evidence base to develop key recommen-
dations regarding triage [21].
Considering the ‘most urgent recommendations’ there
are five recommendations that are selected by both
expert groups. This is a strong signal that those five
recommendations have a high urgency. Organizations
have to develop a generic plan, which is flexible to
allow for changes to reflect new developments during a
specific outbreak. Furthermore, they should work to-
gether and tune their respective plans. Also the staff
protection and infection control measures are consid-
ered urgent by both groups. In addition training of all
designated professionals is considered urgent. It is not
surprising these five recommendations were selected.
The preparedness plan, training and exercises and infec-
tion control measures receive a great deal of attention
in the preparedness literature, implying there is a gen-
eral consensus that these elements are important (Huis,
A., Belfroid E., Klein Breteler, J., van Steenbergen,
J.,Hulscher, M. Defining and improving healthcare sys-
tem's preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks: a
systematic review identifying generic key recommenda-
tions and their connections to continuous quality im-
provement. Submitted).
In addition, we found several differences in the ‘most
urgent recommendations’ selected meaning that not all
recommendations are equally important for the different
groups. Differences between both groups in the se-
lected’10 most urgent’ can presumably be explained by
the different perspectives of both respondent groups.
The National Focal Points selected several recommenda-
tions about the development of the preparedness plan
and other formal procedures. The preparedness experts
selected the more practical recommendations. When im-
proving outbreak preparedness it is impossible to focus
on the total set of recommendations because of the size
of the set, so it makes sense to concentrate on the most
urgent recommendations. The differences between both
groups show us that the background and perspective of
the professional is very influential in the choice for the
most urgent recommendations. Therefor it is very im-
portant that all relevant stakeholders from the region are
included in outbreak preparation so that no perspectives
are left out.
Our study has several limitations. Firstly, we realize
that our data concern only rich industrialized countries
and the recommendations therefore are not easily ap-
plicable to low income countries with completely differ-
ent context, infrastructure, priorities and resources.
However, we concentrated on the wealthy counties as
they have the possibilities, research, and experts to
achieve the highest preparedness standards. A similar
systematic approach should be used (systematic review
and expert consensus procedure) to select recommenda-
tions for low- and middle-income countries. Secondly,
the aim of the study was to develop a set of recommen-
dations for the first local response in an outbreak situ-
ation. Although we urged the international experts to fill
out the questionnaire from that perspective, we realize
that these might be biased to more managerial aspects.
However, we observed high similarity between the se-
lected items by the “true first responders” in the Dutch
panel with those of the international experts of “quasi
first-responders”. Another limitation is the focus on
outbreaks and not all hazard preparedness. We did so
because outbreaks require unique recommendations be-
cause of the transferable potential of pathogens and an
all hazard approach would miss, for outbreaks specific,
relevant recommendations. One of the strengths of our
study is the inclusion of a wide variety of experts in the
field of outbreak preparedness. All our respondent
groups (n = 14, n = 14 and n = 8) contained a sufficient
number of participants as compared to the recom-
mended 7–15 number of participants [15]. The national
panel consisted of a wide variety of disciplines involved
in outbreak preparedness. The panel of the National
Focal Points on preparedness and response covered the
entire European Union and the respondent panel of the
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preparedness experts had a worldwide coverage includ-
ing different specialties and experienced respondents.
Conclusions
We present a set of generic recommendations, including
a prioritization of the most urgent ones. When preparing
for the next crises, these can provide the basis for front-
line organizations to guide decisions on how and where
to start, as well as to identify weaknesses. Outbreak pre-
paredness requires a solid scientific base. While this field
of research is rather new, more efforts are needed to
provide systematic evidence on high quality prepared-
ness, ideally linking it to outbreak response outcomes.
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